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While privatizing Social Security can improve labor supply incentives, it can also reduce 
risk sharing. We simulate a 50-percent privatization using an overlapping-generations 
model where heterogeneous agents with elastic labor supply face idiosyncratic earnings 
shocks and longevity uncertainty. When wage shocks are insurable, privatization 
produces about $30,100 of extra resources for each future household after all transitional 
losses have been paid. When wages are not insurable, privatization reduces efficiency by 
about $8,100 per future household. We check the robustness of these results to different 
model specifications as well as policy reforms and arrive at several surprising 
conclusions. First, privatization performs better in a closed economy, where interest rates 
decline with capital accumulation, than in an open economy. Second, privatization also 
performs better when an actuarially-fair private annuity market does not exist. Third, 
government matching of private contributions on a progressive basis is not very effective 
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It has been known for some time that shutting down (“privatizing") a pay-as-you-go social security
system would simply reallocate resources between generations when all economic variables are deter-
ministic and labor supply is inelastic. In particular, no new resources would be created in present value
once the “winners" have fully compensated the “losers."1 Allowing for elastic labor supply as well as
various risks that are difficult to insure in the private market, however, changes things considerably.
On one hand, privatization could produce efficiency gains by reducing the effective tax rate on
labor supply. Payroll taxes distort labor supply decisions for many participants because a mature pay-
as-you-go social security provides an internal rate of return on average payroll contributions that is
below the return that participants could have received in the private market. As a result, for every dollar
contributed to a mature social security, future benefits increase by less than a dollar in present value
– the difference is an effective tax. This tax services the implicit debt inherited from past generations
who received more from Social Security than they paid. In addition, the U.S. Social Security system,
in particular, is designed to be progressive in nature by giving a household with a lower Average
Index of Monthly Earnings (AIME) a larger Social Security benefit relative to their AIME, i.e., a
larger “replacement rate". This intra-generational redistribution increases effective marginal tax rates
on households with AIME’s above the economy-wide average while reducing effective marginal tax
rates on households with smaller AIME’s.
On the other hand, the U.S. Social Security system also provides two sources of risk sharing that
could be reduced by privatization. First, the progressive benefit formula shares wage shocks among
participants that are difficult to insure in the private market. Privatization, therefore, could reduce this
insurance unless it were complemented with some other form of redistribution. Second, Social Secu-
rity pays benefits until the beneficiary and spouse die rather than over a fixed number of years. To
the extent that longevity uncertainty is also difficult to insure privately, privatization could also reduce
annuity protection.
I.A. Overview of Our Approach
Determining the overall change in efficiency from privatization requires simulation analysis. We
use a heterogeneous overlapping-generations model in which agents with elastic labor supply face
1See, e.g., Breyer [1989], Feldstein [1995], Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes [1998], Murphy and Welch [1998], Mariger
[1999], Shiller [1999], and Diamond and Orszag [2003].
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idiosyncratic earnings shocks and longevity uncertainty. The economy’s entire transition path after
privatization is calculated.2 To determine the Hicksian efficiency gain or loss from this reform, each
household of every generation and income class receives a lump-sum rebate or tax to return their
expected remaining lifetime utility to their pre-reform levels. If the net amount of new resources
remaining after these rebates and taxes is positive, then privatization produces an efficiency gain; if
negative, an efficiency loss. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), new net resources (positive or
negative) are distributed to future households in equal amounts (growth adjusted over time).
We consider a stylized partial privatization where traditional Social Security benefits are reduced
slowly across time; the initial elderly are fully protected. Benefit levels eventually reach 50 percent of
their original scheduled value. Payroll taxes, which cover Social Security benefits on a pay-as-you-go
basis, are, therefore, also reduced over time. While younger workers alive at the time of the reform
will eventually see their payroll taxes decline, their effective labor income tax rates actually increase
throughout a large period of their lifetime because they help pay for a large part of the transitional
benefits owed to retirees and older workers without receiving full benefits themselves. In this sense,
the “transition costs" to personal accounts are effectively financed with a labor income tax. However,
workers born in the long run enjoy smaller effective tax rates on their labor income.
I.B. Summary of Our Findings
We find that privatization can substantially improve labor supply incentives. When wage shocks
are assumed to be insurable in the private market, our stylized partial privatization produces new net
resources equal to $30,100 per future household in our benchmark model. However, when, more real-
istically, wages are not insurable, privatization reduces efficiency by about $8,100 per future household
despite improving labor supply incentives. This loss occurs even though privatization substantially
increases the welfare of those born in the long run by increasing the capital stock and reducing the
effective tax rates on labor income.
The efficiency loss that we calculate when wages are not insurable, though, makes four key as-
sumptions that might appear at first glance to be biased against privatization. Several surprising insights
emerge as we investigate each of these assumptions more closely.
2This paper builds upon the work by İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu, and Joines [1995], Huang, Imrohoroğlu, and Sargent
[1997], and Conesa and Krueger [1999]. İmrohoroğlu et al. focus on steady states and find that the value of risk sharing
is outweighed by the reduction in capital. Huang et al. and Conesa and Krueger consider transition dynamics and present
welfare calculations for different generations. Our analysis finds that while privatization typically raises long-run welfare it
often fails to increase efficiency due to larger losses of transitional generations.
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First, our benchmark economy is closed to international capital flows. As a result, capital accu-
mulation after privatization reduces interest rates, discouraging more accumulation. If, instead, capital
could flow across borders then more capital could be accumulated with no reduction in the rate of return
to saving. However, interestingly, we find that the efficiency losses from partial privatization are even
larger (equal to about $10,100 per future household) in a small open economy version of our model
that allows for perfect international capital flows. As expected, privatization leads to substantially more
capital accumulation with open capital markets. But, for the purpose of determining efficiency gains,
the higher interest rate in the open economy case, relative to privatization in the closed economy, also
means that it is more costly to borrow against the long-run gains from privatization in order to compen-
sate households alive during the transition that would otherwise lose from privatization. This finding
emphasizes the fact that gains to macroeconomic variables alone are not necessarily good metrics for
inferring efficiency gains.
Second, our benchmark calculations assume that a private annuity market does not exist, and so
the pre-reform Social Security system not only provides insurance against wage uncertainty but against
longevity as well. Households, therefore, must guard against outliving their resources after privatization
by relying more on precautionary saving, which is less efficient at smoothing consumption across
states than insurance markets. However, rather surprisingly, we find that allowing for an actuarially-
fair private annuity market also increases efficiency losses (to about $10,900 per future household)
relative to our benchmark case. This result can be mostly traced to the relative smaller amount of
precautionary saving after privatization when private annuity markets exist. The higher interest rate in
this case increases the cost at which compensation can be made across generations. Less precautionary
savings and lower labor supply also reduce the tax bases relative to the benchmark privatization, thereby
increasing the income tax rates that are required to fund the rest of government.
Third, our benchmark model ignores the fact that poor households might not live as long as wealth-
ier households. As a result, the initial Social Security system in our benchmark model might over-
estimate the amount of redistribution – and, hence, risk sharing – that is being provided. However,
we find that reducing progressivity in the baseline Social Security system does not have a monotonic
impact on the efficiency gains following privatization: efficiency losses can actually worsen relative to
the baseline. The reason is that a lower assumed amount of progressivity also reduces the amount of
distortion caused by the payroll tax in the initial baseline economy, leaving less opportunity to produce
efficiency gains from privatization.
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Fourth, the stochastic nature of wages in our benchmark economy is calibrated to the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, which is likely measured with a fair amount of error. The insurance value provided
by Social Security, therefore, might be over-estimated in our baseline economy. But we find that
reducing transitory shocks in our model also does not have a monotonic impact on efficiency gains.
The reason is that a reduction in transitory shocks also effectively makes any shock that does occur
more permanent. Only in the limit, when the shocks go to zero, are efficiency gains guaranteed from
privatization.
Another potential line of criticism of our results is that the privatization plan that we consider is
fairly stylized and does not explicitly include any mechanism that shares the idiosyncratic wage shocks
that were previously partially insured under Social Security. We, therefore, consider two modifications
to our privatization plan itself.
First, we also simulate privatization where the government matches contributions made by poorer
households. The match is financed with general-revenue income taxes and is reduced linearly across
income classes so that a household with median income receives no match. We find that matching
contributions does not have a monotonic effect on efficiency gains either. Too much matching can
actually worsen efficiency by introducing new marginal tax rates associated with the match phase-out
as well as increased income taxes.
Second, we show that simply increasing the progressivity of the smaller Social Security program
that remains after partial privatization is more effective. Compared to contribution matching, this al-
ternative produces smaller marginal tax rates because Social Security benefits are computed based on
lifetime earnings whereas the match is based on contemporaneous earnings. However, efficiency losses
still emerge because, while more progressive, the new system is smaller in scale than the traditional
system being replaced. But we show that additional progressivity allows privatization to produce effi-
ciency gains if the transition were financed with a consumption tax.
I.C. Outline of Rest of the Paper
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section II describes the model; Section III explains the calibra-
tion of the model; Section IV presents simulation results from privatization with and without insurance
markets for wage uncertainty; Section V investigates the robustness of the results in Section IV to al-
ternative model designs; Section VI considers alternative policy reforms; and, Section VII concludes
the paper. The Appendices explain the computational algorithm in more detail.
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II. Model
Our model has three sectors: heterogeneous households with elastic labor supply; a competitive
representative firm with constant-returns-to-scale production technology; and a government with a full
commitment technology. Like most previous analyses of Social Security reform, our model’s pre-
reform neoclassical economy is stationary by construction, and so we don’t capture the effects of
projected demographic changes.3 We, however, are only interested in comparing the efficiency gains
from privatization against the baseline, not examining the implications of demographics.
We investigated the U.S. federal tax system in Nishiyama and Smetters [2005a]. The current pa-
per uses a more extensive model with a detailed social security sector to investigate arguably the most
important public program for income risk-sharing inside the United States, the U.S. Social Security
system. The more extensive model contained in this paper requires the addition of another state vari-
able, which significantly increases the complexity of the model and the required computation time from
several hours to typically several days per simulation. We also consider an extended range of modeling
assumptions as well as policy experiments.
II.A. The Household Sector
Households are heterogeneous with respect to the following variables: age i; working ability e
(measured by hourly wages); beginning-of-period wealth holdings a; and, average historical earnings
b that determine their Social Security benefits. Each year, a large number (normalized to unity) of
new households of age 20 enter the economy. Population grows at a constant rate ν. A household
of age i observes an idiosyncratic working ability shock e at the beginning of each year and chooses
its optimal consumption c, working hours h, and end-of-period wealth holding a0, taking as given
the government’s policy schedule and future factor prices.4 At the end of each year, a fraction of
households die according to standard mortality rates; no one lives beyond age 109. For simplicity, all
households represent two-earner married couples of the same age.
Let s denote the individual state of a household,
s = (i, e, a, b),
3We are aware of only a few papers, including De Nardi, İmrohoroğlu and Sargent (1999), Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser
(2001), and Nishiyama (2004), that attempt to capture the effect of non-stationary demographics on baseline factor prices.
4Because there are no aggregate shocks in the present model, households can perfectly foresee factor prices and policy
variables using the current distribution of households and the current policy variables. Yet, their own future working ability
and mortality are uncertain.
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where i ∈ I = {20, ..., 109} is the household’s age, e ∈ E = [emin, emax] is its age-dependent
working ability (the hourly wage), a ∈ A = [amin, amax] is its beginning-of-period wealth, and b ∈
B = [bmin, bmax] is its average historical earnings for Social Security purposes.5
Let St denote the state of the economy at the beginning of year t,
St = (xt(s),WLS,t,WG,t),
where xt(s) is the joint distribution of households where s ∈ I×E×A×B. WLS,t is the beginning-of-
period net wealth held by the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA), which as described below,
is used to determine the efficiency gain or loss from privatization. WG,t is the net wealth of the rest of
the government.
LetΨt denote the government policy schedule known at the beginning of year t,
Ψt = {WLS,s+1,WG,s+1, CG,s, τ I,s(.), τP,s(.), trSS,s(s), trLS,s(s)}∞s=t,
where CG,s is government consumption, τ I,s(.) is an income tax function, τP,s(.) is a payroll tax
function for Social Security (OASDI), trSS,s(s) is a Social Security benefit function, and trLS,s(s) is
an LSRA wealth redistribution function. The specifications of these functions are described below.
The household’s problem is
(1) v(s,St;Ψt) = max
c,h













{wteh+ (1 + rt)(a+ trLS,t(s))− τ I,t(wteh, rt(a+ trLS,t(s)), trSS,t(s))(2)
− τP,t(wteh) + trSS,t(s)− c} ≥ a0min,t(s),
a = 0 if i = 20, a ≥ 0 if i ≥ 65,
where the utility function, ui(.), takes the Cobb-Douglas form nested within a time-separable isoelastic
5The average historical earnings are used to calculate the Social Security benefits of each household. The variable b
approximates the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) multiplied by 12 as of age i.
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specification,
(3) ui(c, h) =
{((1 + ni/2)−ζc)α(hmax − h)1−α}1−γ
1− γ ;
γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; ni is the number of dependent children at the parents’ age i;
ζ is the “adult equivalency scale" that converts the consumption by children into their adult equivalent
amounts; and, hmax is the maximum working hours. Wages are stochastic and follow a Markov process
that is described in more detail below.
The constant β is the rate of time preference; φi is the survival rate at the end of age i; wt is the
wage rate per efficiency unit of labor (accordingly, wteh is total labor compensation at age i in time t);
and rt is the rate of return to capital. Individual variables of the model are normalized by the exogenous
rate of labor augmenting technological change, μ. Our choice for ui(.) is consistent with the conditions
that are necessary for the existence of a long-run steady state in the presence of constant population
growth. Hence, μ is also equal to the per-capita growth rate of output and capital in steady state. The
term β(1 + μ)α(1−γ), therefore, is the growth-adjusted rate of time preference.
a0min,t(s) is the state-contingent minimum level of end-of-period wealth that is sustainable, that is,
even if the household receives the worst possible shocks in future working abilities.6 At the beginning
of the next period, the state of this household when private annuity markets do not exist becomes
(4) s0 = (i+ 1, e0, a0 + qt, b0),
where qt denotes accidental bequests that a household receives at the end of the period. In the presence
of perfect annuity markets, the household’s state in the next period is instead
(5) s0 = (i+ 1, e0, a0/φi, b0).
6In particular, a0min,t(s) is allowed to be negative but cannot exceed in magnitude the present value of the worst possible
future labor income stream at maximum working hours, sometimes called the “natural borrowing limit." Although not shown
explicitly in equation (2) in order to save on notation, any borrowing (i.e., a0 < 0) by an agent age i at time t must be done
at rate (1 + rt)/φi − 1 in order cover the chance that they will die before repaying their loan.
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The average historical earnings for this household, b, follows the following process,
(6) b0 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩





+min(wteh/2, wehmax,t)} if 25 ≤ i ≤ 59
b/(1 + μ) if i ≥ 60
,
wherewehmax,t is the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax cap, which is $80,400
in 2001. U.S. Social Security benefits are computed on the basis of the highest 35 years of earnings.
For simplicity, the model assumes that the highest 35 years of earnings correspond to ages between 25
and 59.
Let xt(s) denote the measure of households, and let Xt(s) be the corresponding cumulative mea-
sure. The measure of households is adjusted by the steady-state population growth rate, ν. The popu-
lation of age 20 households is normalized to unity in the baseline economy along the balanced growth
path, that is, Z
E
dXt(20, e, 0, 0) = 1.
Let 1[a=y] be an indicator function that returns 1 if a = y and 0 if a 6= y. Then, the law of motion of









where πi,i+1 denotes the transition probability of working ability from age i to age i+ 1.
The aggregate value of accidental bequests each period is deterministic in our model because all
risks are idiosyncratic and, therefore, uncorrelated across households. Accidental bequests could,
therefore, be simply distributed equally and deterministically across all surviving households, as in
previous work. That approach, however, suffers from two shortcomings. First, households would an-
ticipate receiving a bequest with certainty, thereby artificially crowding out their pre-bequest savings.
This savings reduction would be mitigated if bequests were random. Second, empirically, the inequality
of bequests is important in generating a realistic measure of wealth inequality.
Our alternative strategy, therefore, distributes bequests randomly to surviving working-age house-
9




















where qt is the average wealth left by deceased households, and η is the ratio of deceased household
to the surviving working-age households. In other words, a constant fraction η of households across
all income groups will receive a bequest of size qt while a constant fraction (1− η) of households will
not. But ex-ante, each household only knows it will receive a bequest with probability η.7
Despite this concentration of bequests, however, our model still does not capture a realistic con-
centration of wealth, a well-known problem for this class of models [Diaz-Jimenez et al., 1997]. While
our model produces a plausible wealth Gini Index equal to 67.9%, the top 1% of households in our
model hold only about 12% of the economy’s wealth in our baseline and up to 15% of wealth under
some of our alternative model assumptions.
II.B. Government
Government tax revenue consists of federal income tax TI,t, and payroll tax for Social Security




















7Future work could go even a step further and allow for a correlation between a household’s own income and the size of
the bequest that they receive. At this point, however, we are not aware of any careful empirical work that would allow us to
include this correlation into our model.
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(1 + μ)(1 + ν)
{(1 + rt)WG,t + TI,t + TP,t − TrSS,t −CG,t},
where CG,t is government consumption.
II.C. Measuring Efficiency Gains
We follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) by measuring efficiency gains from Social Security pri-
vatization using a Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority that compensates households who would oth-
erwise lose from reform.8 To be clear, the LSRA is not being proposed as an actual government insti-
tution. Instead, it is simply a hypothetical mechanism that allows us to measure the standard Hicksian
efficiency gains in general equilibrium associated with privatization. A policy reform that increases
Hicksian efficiency is potentially Pareto improving whereas a reform that reduces efficiency cannot be
Pareto improving.9
To see how the LSRA works, suppose that a new policy is announced at the beginning of pe-
riod 1. First, the LSRA makes a lump-sum compensating variation transfer or tax, trCV,1(s), to each
living household of age i in order to return its expected remaining lifetime utility at state s to its pre-
reform level in the baseline (pre-reform) economy. Next, the LSRA makes a lump-sum transfer or tax,
trCV,t(s), to each future household (born in periods 2, 3, ...) to make it as well off as in the baseline
economy, conditional on its initial state at age 20. Thus far, however, the net present value of these
taxes and transfers across living and future households will generally not sum to zero. So, finally,
the LSRA makes an additional lump-sum transfer (tax), ∆tr, to each future household so that the net
present value across all transfers is zero. For illustrative purposes, we assume, like Auerbach and Kot-
likoff, that these additional transfers are uniform across future generations on a growth-adjusted basis.
8We, however, extend the Auerbach and Kotlikoff approach to a heterogeneous-agent environment.
9Of course, constructing a policy that is actually Pareto improving from a policy that improves efficiency is a tougher
task. A “ horse race" exist between the amount of household heterogeneity in the model versus the degrees of freedom that
the modeler believes that the government has in its policy toolbox. With lots of heterogeneity but few degrees of freedom,
it will be hard to construct a policy that is actually Pareto improving even if it is potentially Pareto improving. With little
heterogeneity and more degrees of freedom, such a possibility materializes. The actual degrees of freedom, of course,
depend on the perceived informational constraints, constitutional issues and political beliefs (e.g., are age-indexed policies
acceptable?). Public economists, therefore, have historically taken the minimalist approach and simply focused on potentially
Pareto improving policies. Our paper also falls within that modest tradition.
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The lump-sum transfers made by the LSRA, therefore, are
(11) trLS,t(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
trCV,t(s) if t = 1
trCV,t(s) +∆tr if t > 1 and i = 20
0 otherwise
.
If ∆tr > 0 then privatization has produced net new resources and so we say that this reform
“increases efficiency." Conversely, if∆tr < 0 then privatization “reduces efficiency."











(1 + μ)(1 + ν)
(1 + rt)(WLS,t − TrLS,t).
II.D. Aggregation and Production
National wealth Wt is the sum of total private wealth, government net wealth WG,t, and LSRA net













In a closed economy, capital stock is equal to national wealth, that is, Kt =Wt, and gross national
product Yt is determined by a constant-returns-to-scale production function,
Yt = F (Kt, Lt).
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The profit-maximizing condition for this competitive firm is
FK(Kt, Lt) = rt + δ,(16)
FL(Kt, Lt) = wt,(17)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
In a small open economy, factor prices, r∗t and w∗t are fixed at international levels, and domestic
capital stock KD,t and labor supply Lt are determined so that the firm’s profit maximizing condition
satisfies,
FK(KD,t, Lt) = r
∗
t + δ,
FL(KD,t, Lt) = w
∗
t .
Gross domestic product YD,t is determined by the production function,
YD,t = F (KD,t, Lt),
and gross national product Yt is determined by
Yt = (r
∗
t + δ)Wt +w
∗
t Lt.
II.E. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Definition Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. Let s = (i, e, a, b) be the individual state of house-
holds, let St = (xt(s),WLS,t,WG,t) be the state of the economy, and letΨt be the government policy
schedule known at the beginning of year t,
Ψt = {WLS,s+1,WG,s+1, CG,s, τ I,s(.), τP,s(.), trSS,s(s), trLS,s(s)}∞s=t.
A series of factor prices {rs, ws}∞s=t, accidental bequests {qs}∞s=t, the policy variables
{WLS,s+1,WG,s+1, CG,s, trLS,s(s)}∞s=t, the parameters of policy functions {ϕs}∞s=t, the value func-
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tion of households {v(s,Ss;Ψs)}∞s=t, the decision rule of households
{d(s,Ss;Ψs)}∞s=t = {c(s,Ss;Ψs), h(s,Ss;Ψs), a0(s,Ss;Ψs)}∞s=t,
and the measure of households {xs(s)}∞s=t, are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, in every period
s = t, ...,∞, each household solves the utility maximization problem (1)–(6) taking Ψt as given; the
firm solves its profit maximization problem, the capital and labor market conditions (14)–(17) clear,
and the government policy schedule satisfies (7)–(13).
In steady-state,
St+1 = St
for all t and s ∈ I ×E ×A×B.
III. Calibration
III.A. Households
The coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, is assumed to be 2.0. The number of dependent children
at the parents’ age i, ni, is calculated using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 2003 Family
Data as shown in Table III. The “adult equivalency scale," ζ, is set at 0.6.10 As discussed later, β is
chosen to hit a target capital-output ratio that produces an interest rate of 6.25 percent in the initial
steady state.11 The maximum working hours of husband and wife, hmax, is set at 8,760, equal to 12
hours per day per person × 365 days × two persons.12 A smaller value for hmax would reduce the
effective labor supply elasticity, and tend to reduce the gains from privatization. The parameter α is
chosen so that the average working hours of households between ages 20 and 64 equals 3,576 hours in
the initial steady-state economy, the average number of hours supplied by married households in the
2003 PSID. Many of these parameters are summarized in Tables I and II. The parameters shown in
Table I are the same for all of our privatization simulations. The parameters shown in Table II depend
on the specification of the model that we assume in the initial steady state.
10Hence, a married couple with two dependent children must consume about 52 percent (i.e., 20.6 = 1.517) more than a
married couple with no children to attain the same level of utility, ceteris paribus.
11It is well known that the exact choice of interest rate in a model without aggregate uncertainty is ambiguous [e.g.,
Blanchard and Fisher 1989, 104]. On one hand, an interest rate of 6.25% is larger than the historic risk-free rate. On the
other hand, it is below the historic marginal product of capital. Some papers calibrate to the risk-free rate while others target
capital’s marginal product.
12The 95th and 99th percentiles of the working hours per married couple of aged 20-64 in the 2003 PSID are 5,719 and
6,810, respectively.
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The working ability in this calibration corresponds to the hourly wage (labor income per hour) of
each household in the 2003 PSID.13 The average hourly wage of a married couple (“head" and “wife"
in PSID) used in the calibration is calculated by
Hourly Wage =
Labor Income (head + wife) + Payroll Taxes / 2
max {Total Hours Worked (head + wife), 2080}
.
We adjusted the salaries in the numerator by adding imputed payroll taxes paid by their employers,
which allows us to levy the entire payroll tax on employees in order to incorporate the payroll tax
ceiling. The max operator in the denominator adjusts the hourly wage for a small fraction of households
in the PSID with large reported salaries but few reported working hours such as the self-employed.
Table IV shows the eight discrete levels of working abilities of five-year age cohorts. We use a
shape-preserving cubic spline interpolation between each five-year age cohort to obtain the working
ability for each age cohort.14 In the version of our model where we “turn off” the idiosyncratic wage
shocks, the hourly wages of the representative household are assumed to be those of the 40–60th
percentile households.
Table IV, however, only shows the different potential “wage buckets” by age as well as the pro-
portion of households in each bucket. It does not itself capture the uncertainty over wages. Using
PSID, therefore, we estimate Markov transition matrixes that specify the probabilities that a house-
hold’s wage will move from one level to a different level the next year. Separate transition matrixes
were constructed for four age ranges—20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59—in order to capture the pos-
sibility that the probabilities themselves might change over the lifecycle. For households aged 60 or
older, we used the matrix for ages 50-59. The Appendix reports the matrixes in detail. We check the
sensitivity of our simulation results to this specification later in the paper.
The population growth rate ν is set to one percent per year while the survival rate φi at the end of
age i = {20, ..., 109} are the weighted averages of the male and female survival rates, as calculated
by the Social Security Administration (2001). The survival rates at the end of age 109 are replaced by
zero, thereby capping the maximum length of life.
13According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the average hourly earnings of production workers have increased by 2.9
percent from 2001 to 2002. Since the 2003 PSID wages correspond to year 2002 while our tax function introduced below is
calibrated to the year 2001, we divide the PSID wages shown in Table IV by 1.029 to convert the hourly wages in 2002 into
growth-adjusted wages in 2001.
14An alternative approach of estimating eight different wage rates for each age would have relied on too few observations.
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III.B. Production
Capital K is the sum of private fixed assets and government fixed assets. In 2000, private fixed
assets were $21,165 billion, government fixed assets were $5,743 billion, and the public held about
$3,410 billion of government debt.15 Government net wealth, therefore, is set equal to 9.5 percent of
total private wealth in the initial steady-state economy. Moreover, the time preference parameter β is
chosen in each variant of our model explored below so that the capital-GDP ratio in the initial steady
state economy is 2.74, the empirical value in 2000.16
Production takes the Cobb-Douglas form,





where, recall, Lt is the sum of working hours in efficiency units. The capital share of output is given
by
θ = 1− Compensation of Employees + (1− θ)× Proprietors’ Income
National Income + Consumption of Fixed Capital
.
The value of θ in 2000 was 0.30.17 The annual per-capita growth rate μ is assumed to be 1.8 percent,
the average rate between 1869 to 1996 (Barro, 1997). Total factor productivity A is set at 0.949, which
normalizes the wage (per efficient labor unit) to unity.





In 2000, private gross fixed investment accounted for 17.2 percent of GDP, and government (federal
and state) gross investment accounted for 3.3 percent of GDP.18 With a capital-output ratio of 2.74, the
ratio of gross investment to fixed capital is 7.5 percent. Subtracting productivity and population growth
rates, the annual depreciation rate is 4.7 percent.
III.C. The Government
Federal income tax and state and local taxes are assumed to be at the level in year 2001 before
the passage of the “Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001” (EGTRRA). Since





households in our model are assumed to be married, we use a standard deduction of $7,600. However,
following Altig et al. (2001), we allow higher income households to itemize deductions when it is
more valuable to do so, and we assume that the value of the itemized deduction increases linearly in
the Adjusted Gross Income.19 The additional exemption per dependent person is $2,900 where the
number of dependent children is consistent with Table III. Table V shows the statutory marginal tax
rates before EGTRRA.20 As noted earlier, a household’s labor income in this calibration includes the
imputed payroll tax paid by its employer. Thus, taxable income is obtained by subtracting the employer
portion of payroll tax from labor income.
The standard deduction, the personal exemption, and all tax brackets grow with productivity over
time so that there is no real bracket creep; this indexing is also needed for the initial economy to be
in steady state. Since the effective tax rate on capital income is reduced by investment tax incentives,
accelerated depreciation and other factors (Auerbach, 1996), the tax function is further adjusted so that
the cross-sectional average tax rate on capital income is about 25 percent lower than the average tax on
labor income.21 In 2000, the ratio of total individual federal income tax revenue (not including Social
Security and Medicare taxes) to GDP was 0.102 and the ratio of corporate income tax to GDP was
0.021. Each statutory federal income tax rate shown in Table V, therefore, is multiplied by ϕI so that
tax revenue (including corporate income tax) totals 12.3 percent of GDP in the initial steady state. The
adjustment factor is between 0.82 and 0.87 for heterogeneous-agent economies with idiosyncratic wage
shocks and 1.0 for the representative-agent economy without wage shocks. State and local income taxes
are modeled parsimoniously with a 4.0 percent flat tax on income above the deduction and exemption
levels used at the federal level.
The tax rate levied on employees for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) is
12.4 percent, and the tax rate for Medicare (HI) is 2.9 percent. In 2001, employee compensation above
$80,400 was not taxable for OASDI. (See Table VI.) Workers with wages above $80,400, therefore,
don’t face a marginal tax or distortions from the Social Security system.
Social Security benefits are based on each worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME),
b/12, and the replacement rate schedule shown in Table VII. The replacement rates are 90 percent for
19In particular, the deduction taken by a household is the greater of the standard deduction and 0.0755×AGI, or
max{$7600, 0.0755×AGI}.
20The key qualitative results reported herein are unaffected if the tax function were instead modeled as net taxes, that is,
after substracting transfers indicated in the Statistics of Income.
21This relative reduction to the tax rate on capital is commonly used by the Congressional Budget Office, and it balances
the legal tax preferences given to capital versus the legal tax benefits given to labor, including tax-preferred fringe benefits.
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the first $561, 32 percent for amounts between $561 and $3,381, and 15 percent for amounts above
$3,381. Social Security, therefore, is progressive in that a worker’s benefit relative to AIME (the
“replacement rate") is decreasing in the AIME.
The U.S. OASDI also pays spousal, survivors’ and disability benefits in addition to the standard
retirement benefit described above. Indeed, retiree benefits accounted for only 69.1 percent of total
OASDI benefits in December 2000.22 OASDI benefits, therefore, are adjusted upward by the pro-
portional adjustment factor ϕSS so that total benefit payments equal total payroll tax revenue. The
adjustment factor ϕSS equals about 1.46 in our model with wage shocks and 1.32 in our model without
wage shocks (Table II). This adjustment proportionally distributes non-retiree OASDI payments across
retirees.
IV. Baseline Policy Experiments
We simulate a stylized phased-in partial privatization of Social Security that begins in year 1. Statu-
tory (or, sometimes called “ scheduled") Social Security benefits are reduced linearly over time. House-
holds age 65 and older in year 1 receive the current-law (baseline) benefits throughout the rest of their
lifetime; households of age 65 in year 2 receive benefits that are 1.25 percent lower than the current-law
level throughout the rest of lifetime; households of age 65 in year 3 receive benefits 2.5 percent lower
than the current law-level, and so on. Households age 25 or younger in year 1, therefore, receive one
half of their traditional Social Security benefits when they turn 65. Pay-as-you-go payroll taxes, there-
fore, are also reduced over time. But the effective tax rates on younger workers alive at the time of the
reform actually increase during the transition because these workers help pay for the traditional bene-
fits owed to retirees and older workers but do not receive full benefits themselves. However, workers
born in the long run enjoy smaller effective tax rates on their labor income.
As is implicit in most previous work on privatization, assets in the new private accounts are assumed
to be perfect substitutes with other private assets, including earning the same market rate of return and
being subject to the same income tax schedule, as outlined above. As a result, the new private accounts
do not have to be explicitly modeled; households will increase their savings in response to a decline in
retirement benefits.
We first consider the representative-agent economy without wage shocks (equivalently, with insur-
able wage shocks) where all households have the wage profile of the 40–60th percentile in Table IV,
22See Table 5.A1 in Social Security Administration (2001).
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i.e., lifetime income group e3. We then turn to a heterogeneous-agent economy with uninsurable wage
shocks. We initially assume that both economies are closed to international capital flows, and that a
private annuity market does not exist.
IV.A. Representative-Agent Economy without Wage Shocks
As shown in Run 1 in Table VIII, 50% privatization of Social Security in the representative-agent
economy increases national wealth by 26.7 percent in the long run compared to the baseline economy.
GNP increases by 12.3 percent in the long run, while labor supply increases by 6.7 percent. These large
gains are driven by pre-funding a portion of Social Security’s liabilities that were previously financed
on a pay-as-you-go (unfunded) basis. Because the effective tax rate on labor income actually increases
in the short run, labor supply initially contracts by 0.1 percent, which requires a small increase in the
statutory payroll tax rate. Over the long run, however, the statutory payroll tax rate declines by 51.9%.
(The payroll tax rate declines by more than 50% in the long run because the wage rate increases with
more capital; labor supply is also larger.) An expanded labor and capital base also allows for federal
income tax rates to be reduced, by 25.5% in the long run.
Despite these positive gains to economic variables, not everyone wins from privatization. As shown
for Run 1 in lefthand column in Table IX (“Without LSRA"), all households alive at the time of the
reform (that is, aged 20 or older) are worse off. For example, the age-20 household at the time of policy
change loses $41,700, as measured by the equivalent variation of an one-time wealth transfer made at
the time of the reform. The age-40 household loses $78,300. Both of these households help pay
for the traditional Social Security benefits received by retirees and older workers, but these younger
households do not receive as large of Social Security benefits themselves. The age-40 household is
especially “stuck in the middle" by paying for traditional benefits but being too old to gain much from
the eventual reduction in payroll taxes. In a closed economy, this household is also hurt by the fall in
the interest rate shown in Table VIII given its large accumulation of wealth at the time of the reform.23
Future households, who pay very little of the transition costs, however, gain substantially from
privatization. For example, newborns in Year 1 gain about $18,500 per couple while generations born
20 years later gain about $57,200. Generations born in the long run (i.e., are age −∞ in Year 1)
gain $66,100. These gains arise mainly from higher wages, smaller payroll taxes, and reduced federal
income taxes.
23For example, the welfare loss of a 40-year old is reduced to $50,700 in a small open economy (not shown), where the
interest rate does not change.
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Overall, privatization produces large efficiency gains, that is, extra resources after the “winners"
compensate the “losers" in present value. This fact can be seen in the righthand column in Table IX
where we simulate the same economy and policy experiment but with an operative Lump-Sum Redis-
tribution Authority (LSRA). Recall that the LSRA transfers exactly enough wealth to would-be losing
households alive at the time of the reform so that their remaining expected lifetime utilities return to
their pre-reform levels. These transfers must be financed with borrowing that is financed with the gains
to future generations. All net new resources (positive or negative) are then distributed equally to future
households (growth adjusted over time). Because the LSRA is part of the general-equilibrium solu-
tion, the macroeconomic outcomes shown in Table VIII will, of course, also change in the presence
of lump-sum transfers. Indeed, including the general-equilibrium effects associated with these lump-
sum transfers are important for calculating efficiency gains, as first noted by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987). The new macroeconomic outcomes with an operative LSRA, though, are not reported in order
to economize on space; only the resulting efficiency gains are shown.24 As demonstrated in Table IX,
privatization produces about $30,100 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) in additional net resources per
each future household that enters the economy in year 2 and later, that is, after all the would-be losing
households have been fully compensated.
IV.B. Heterogeneous-Agent Economy with Wage Shocks
Run 2 in Table VIII also shows the effect of the same stylized privatization experiment in a more
realistic economy with uninsurable wage shocks. Unlike in the deterministic economy, Social Secu-
rity’s progressive benefit formula now shares some wage risks, thereby providing some insurance that
is unattainable in the private market. National wealth now increases by 18.8 percent in the long run, but
by less than in the representative-agent economy (Run 1). A portion of private saving in the pre-reform
economy is now for precautionary motives, which is less sensitive to changes in Social Security policy.
Indeed, unlike Run 1, a non-trival portion of the build-up in national weath in Run 2 is due to increased
precautionary savings as privatization reduces the risk sharing of wage shocks. Labor supply increases
by 3.3 percent in the long run and GNP is 7.7 percent higher.
Similar to the representative-agent economy, most households alive at the time of the reform are
worse off because they have to pay higher taxes to finance the transition. Run 2 in Table IX shows
that a 40-year old in the top one percent of the wage distribution (e8) at the time of privatization loses
24These tables are available from the authors.
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$134,100. As with Run 1, future households, however, gain considerably from reduced payroll taxes,
smaller income tax rates, and higher wages. Even households in the lowest 20 percent of the wage
distribution (e1) born in the long run gain $72,600 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars). Overall, priva-
tization, though, no longer improves efficiency. After the LSRA returns the welfare of all households
to their pre-reform levels, it distributes a negative $8,100 to each future household. This loss contrasts
sharply with the gain of $30,100 in the deterministic economy discussed above.
V. Alternative Assumptions in the Heterogeneous-Agent Economy
The efficiency loss in our benchmark economy shown in Run 2, however, is based on four key
model assumptions that might appear at first glance to be biased against privatization. We now inves-
tigate each of these assumptions, which leads to several surprising insights. In each case, the model
is recalibrated in order to hit specific observable targets on economic relationships in the initial steady
state that were discussed earlier. The resulting parameters are summarized for each Run in Table II.
V.A. In a Small Open Economy
Our benchmark economy shown in Run 2 is closed to international capital flows. When privatiza-
tion increases capital accumulation, interest rates drop, thereby discouraging even more accumulation.
If, instead, capital could flow across borders then more capital could be accumulated with no reduction
in the rate of return to saving.
Run 3, reported in Table X, therefore, shows the effect of privatization in the setting of a small open
economy where any changes that the capital-labor ratio would have on factor prices are nullified im-
mediately by international capital flows. National wealth does indeed increase by substantially more in
the open-economy case, by 35.7% or almost double the amount reported earlier for the closed economy
setting (Run 2, Table VIII). The gain in labor supply, though, is considerably smaller – 0.8% versus
3.3% – since the wage rate does not rise. The net effect is to increase GNP by 11.3 percent in the long
run, compared to only 7.7 percent in Run 2.
Table XI shows that the welfare losses of households alive at the time of the reform tend to be
smaller in the case of a small-open economy (Run 3) relative to our closed benchmark economy (Run
2, Table IX). A fixed interest rate protects the value of wealth that was accumulated prior to reform.
The gains to future households born in the long run also tend to be a little smaller in the small open
economy, mostly due to a fixed wage rate per efficiency unit. One notable exception is that wealthier
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households born in the long run gain more in the open economy because interest rates do not fall.
Overall, therefore, it might appear at first that privatization in an open economy setting would produce
a smaller efficiency loss than in the closed economy. This hunch, however, is incorrect. When the
LSRA is operative, Table XI shows that the efficiency losses are actually slightly larger in the small
open economy, equal to $10,100 per each future household, compared to a loss of $8,100 with a closed
economy.
One reason for this suprising result is that the LSRA’s cost of borrowing is higher in the small
open economy setting since the interest rate does not decrease over time after privatization, as in the
closed-economy setting. Recall that the LSRA must, in effect, borrow from future generations, who
would otherwise win from reform, in order to return current workers to their pre-reform level of utility,
who would otherwise lose from reform. A larger interest rate increases the cost of these inter-temporal
transfers.
Another reason that the open-economy case performs worse is that income taxes can decrease by
relatively more in the closed-economy case in order to balance the government’s budget because wages
increase. Notice from Table X that the income tax drops by 10.8% in the long run with an open
economy, compared to 11.2% in the closed economy.
To partially separate these two different effects, we re-ran both the closed- and open-economy cases
holding the income tax rate fixed at its steady state level. In order to satisfy the government’s dynamic
budget constraint in general equilibrium, we first experimented with reducing government consumption
(the results are not shown in the tables herein in order to save on space25). In that case, the open econ-
omy setting again produce a larger efficiency loss than the closed-economy case. We then experimented
with using lump-sum taxes / rebates to satisfy the government’s dynamic budget constraint; lump-sum
transfers were given equally to each household. Again, the open economy setting produced relatively
larger efficiency losses (again, not shown). These results demonstrate the importance of interest-rate
channel in producing relatively larger efficiency losses in the open economy setting.
V.B. Perfect Annuity Markets
Thus far, we have assumed private annuity markets do not exist and so, in addition to sharing wage
uncertainty, the Social Security system shares longevity uncertainty in a way the private market cannot.
It would appear at first glance, therefore, that privatization has a better chance of producing efficiency
25Tables are available from the authors.
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gains if we instead assumed that a private annuity market is available. Surprisingly, this intuition also
turns out to be incorrect.
Run 4 in Table XI shows that the efficiency losses are actually larger with perfect private annuity
markets than without (Run 2). In particular, each household loses $10,900, compared to $8,100 shown
earlier without an annuity market (Run 2, Table IX). Privatization with perfect private annuities leads
to only a 14.5 percent increase in national wealth in the long run (Table X), compared to a 18.8 per-
cent increase without a private annuity market (Run 2, Table VIII). The reason is that, without private
annuities available, households increase their precautionary savings in Run 2 after privatization as the
annuity insurance provided by Social Security is reduced; in contrast, households can rely more on the
private annuity insurance market rather than precautionary savings in Run 4. The smaller amount of
precautionary savings in Run 4 produces larger efficiency losses for three reasons: (i) the LSRA must
borrow at a relatively higher interest rate; (ii) income taxes are higher since there is less capital and
labor income; and (iii) the interest elasticity of saving is higher, increasing the role that falling interest
rates have on discouraging additional saving.
V.C. Less Initial Redistribution
Social Security’s progressive benefit formula, as shown in Table VII, is intended to redistribute re-
sources toward the lifetime poor. A recent literature, though, has suggested that Social Security might
be less redistributive than traditionally thought because, in part, poorer people don’t live as long as
wealthier people, thereby collecting fewer; poor people are also less likely to qualify for a spousal
benefit.26 Our benchmark model ignores these complications and, therefore, might over-estimate the
amount of risk sharing that is being provided by Social Security under the baseline. To test the im-
portance of this redistribution, we changed the marginal replacement rates shown in Table VII from
the levels 90 / 32 / 15 to 60 / 31 / 22.5, which has the effect of reducing by about one-half the partial-
equilibrium intra-generational redistribution from households with above-average AIME to households
with below-average AIME.
As shown in Table XI, however, a static reduction in redistribution has a non-monotonic impact
on efficiency gains. In particular, the efficiency loss from 50% privatization is now $9,400 per future
household, which is slightly larger than our baseline measure of $8,100. Intuitively, a system with less
26See, for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2001), Brown (2002), Liebman (2002), and Fullerton and Mast (2005).
Incorporating an income-mortality correlation directly into our model produces technical challenges when γ > 1. We
instead reduce the progressivity of our benefit formula in a manner consistent with the conclusions of these papers, which
also captures the inequality in spousal benefits.
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initial redistribution also has contains fewer distortions to labor supply in the baseline and, hence, less
opportunity for efficiency gains from reform.
V.D. Smaller Transitory Shocks
Another key assumption in our model is the size of the transitory working ability shocks and their
persistence. Recall that we constructed the age-working ability transition matrices from the 1989-92
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Floden and Lindé (2001), however, persuasively argue that
measurement error in the PSID might be as large as the size of the real fluctuation.
Run 6 shown in Tables X and XI show the economic and welfare effects, respectively, of privatiza-
tion when the transitory shocks are reduced to only half of their previous values we used in the main
calibration. National wealth increases by 20.9 percent in the long run compared to 18.8 percent for
our baseline, Run 2. However, notice that the efficiency losses actually increase to $14,000 per future
household (relative to a $8,100 loss in Run 2) under the LSRA. This counter-intuitive result can be
explained by the fact that a reduction in transitory shocks also increases the persistence of any shock.
As a result, the effect of any negative shock becomes more permanent, potentially increasing the value
of the risk sharing in the former Social Security system.27 In the limit, however, the model collapses
to one with no wage uncertainty if the transitory shocks are eliminated, thereby resulting in efficiency
gains.
VI. Alternative Experiments in the Heterogeneous-Agent Economy
Another potential criticism of our simulations is that the experiment itself is too simple in that it
makes no attempt to incorporate any type of redistribution within the new privatizated system. We,
therefore, consider two alternatives for reintroducing redistribution into the reform: matching contribu-
tions made to private accounts as well as increasing the progressivity in the smaller traditional system
that remains. For each case, we use our baseline model (Run 2) and the corresponding parameter as-
sumptions shown in Table II. Only the policy reform itself changes.
VI.A.Contribution Matching
Run 7 considers privatization in which working households with low levels of labor income receive
a fairly generous match equal to 10 percent of their earnings. This matching rate declines linearly to
27We benefited from a helpful conversation with Dirk Krueger on this point.
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zero as labor income approaches $60,000, which is slightly above the median household income in
the model economy.28 While ensuing Social Security deficits continue to be financed a pay-as-you-go
payroll tax, the contribution match is financed each year from general revenue using income taxes.
As shown in Run 7 in Table XII, privatization with contribution matching decreases labor supply,
GNP and national wealth over the first decade; in contrast privatization under our baseline (Run 2)
produced gains to these variables throughout the entire transition path. Eventually, privatization with
contribution matching leads to a 5.9% gain in GNP, compared to a 7.7% increase under our baseline
shown in Run 2. Contribution matching also produces only a 2.0% increase in labor supply in the long
run, compared to a 3.3% increase under the baseline. The gains to macroeconomic variables under
contribution matching are generally smaller relative to the baseline simulation for two reasons. First,
contribution matching produces positive marginal tax rates associated with the phase-out.29 Second,
the matching itself must be financed with a distorting income tax.
The welfare gains for Run 7 reported in Table XIII show that contribution matching tends to im-
prove the welfare of poorer households relative to Run 2 without the match. Whereas the poorest
households (e1) born 20 years after reform gains $62,800 without the match, they gain $65,900 with
the match. Not surprising, the richest households, however, are worse off since they don’t receive any
of the match but must help finance it; they gained $67,000 without the match in the long run but only
$58,800 with the match.
With the LSRA operative, Table XIII shows that privatization now leads to an efficiency loss of
$13,200, which is actually larger than efficiency loss under the baseline. Recall that privatization
already increases effective marginal tax rates on labor for many workers caught in the transition. Con-
tribution matching enhances those distortions with a phase-out range as well as with general-revenue
financing. While contribution matching reintroduces some risk sharing that was lost during privatiza-
tion, the additional distortions to labor supply – which increase by roughly the square of the tax rate –
is enough to reverse the potential benefits.
In order to understand this surprising result some more, we also simulated privatization, both with
28We also simulated contribution matching without a phase-out. The efficiency losses were actually larger than those
reported in this section. Whereas eliminating the phase-out eliminates some implicit marginal tax rates, it enhances the
income tax distortions since more revenue is needed to finance the contribution matches. We also considered financing
the phased-out match with a negative match on those with above-average incomes. Although potentially more efficient at
redistribution than an income tax since the poor are not financing their own match, it also performed poorly. Labor supply
tends to be fairly elastic in our model whereas the savings elasticity is relatively low with precautionary saving.
29This matching schedule is equivalent with the marginal labor income tax of -10 percent at $0 of labor income, 0 percent
at $30,000, 10 percent at $60,000, and 0 percent for labor income above $60,000.
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and without contribution matching, in which the transition is financed using a consumption tax that is
more efficient at raising revenue than payroll taxes.30 A 10% match rate now leads to smaller effi-
ciency losses relative to the baseline privatization. However, a 20% match produces larger efficiency
losses relative to the baseline. These non-monotonic reductions in efficiency losses can be traced to the
trade-off between risk sharing and labor supply distortions: some match is beneficial but is dominated
by distortions at higher tax rates. In fact, there is no match rate that allows privatization to produce
efficiency gains.
VI.B. Progressive Benefit Schedule
Run 8 takes a different approach to maintaining some progressivity after privatization. It immedi-
ately increases the progressivity of the Social Security benefit that remains after privatization by raising
the replacement rate of the lowest wage income bracket from 90 percent to 120 percent while reducing
the replacement rate of the highest wage income bracket from 15% to 7.5%. Run 9 is even more ag-
gressive in the redistribution by raising the replacement rate of the lowest wage income bracket to 150
percent while reducing the top replacement rate to 0%.
Table XIII shows that increasing the progressivity of the smaller Social Security system that re-
mains after privatization is better than contribution matching at protecting the welfare of the poor at
the time of reform as well as reducing efficiency losses. Now, privatization reduces efficiency by only
$7,100 per future household under the LSRA in Run 8, and by $6,700 in Run 9.
Both of these losses are smaller than our baseline loss of $8,100. Intuitively, increasing the progres-
sivity of the remaining system performs better than contribution matching because more redistribution
can be accomplished with less distortion to labor supply. Whereas contribution matching is based on
the labor income in any given year, Social Security’s progressive benefit is based on a household’s
lifetime earnings, which is harder to change.
To give partial privatization the best chance of succeeding, we re-consider Run 9 but were the
transition is now financed with a consumption tax.31 The payroll tax is immediately reduced in half
and the difference in cash flow between payable benefits and collected payroll taxes is financed with a
flat consumption tax. Run 10 in Table XIII shows that progressive privatization in this case can now
30Simulation results with a consumption tax using a previous version of our model are reported in our working paper,
Nishiyama and Smetters [2005b].
31Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1998, 2001) also considered different tax bases for financing the transition path. How-
ever, their analyses used a deterministic OLG model and only examined changes to macroeconomic variables. They did not
examine efficiency gains.
26
lead to an efficiency gain equal to $2,800 per each future household. This improvement in efficiency
can be traced to replacing part of the distorting payroll tax with a consumption tax that incorporates an
efficient lump-sum levy on existing assets. Of course, this same improvement in efficiency could be
achieved inside of the traditional system. Some proponents of privatization, however, have suggested
that the transition costs associated with private accounts presents a unique political opportunity for
implementing a retail sales tax.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated whether a stylized Social Security privatization generates efficiency gains
or losses in the presence of an overlapping-generations economy with elastic labor supply, idiosyncratic
wage shocks and longevity uncertainty. We found that the privatization of Social Security produces ef-
ficiency gains in a representative-agent economy without wage shocks (or, equivalently, if these shocks
are insurable). In a heterogeneous-agent economy with idiosyncratic and uninsurable wage shocks,
however, the overall efficiency of the economy is reduced by our stylized privatization since the exist-
ing Social Security system provides a valuable source of risk sharing through its progressive benefit
formula. This result was fairly robust to a wide range of model considerations as well as policy re-
forms. Privatization leads to efficiency gains only when combined with an efficient tax to finance the
transition as well as a properly-constructed restoration of progressivity.
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Appendix 1
The Markov transition matrixes of working ability are constructed for four age groups—20-29, 30-
39, 40-49, and 50-59—from the hourly wages in the PSID individual data 1990, 91, 92, and 93. The
transition matrix of each age group is the average of three transition matrixes, from 1989 to 90, from
90 to 91, and from 91 to 92. For households aged 60 or older, we used the matrix for ages 50-59.
Γi∈{20,...,29} =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0.5964 0.2499 0.0875 0.0464 0.0118 0.0048 0.0029 0.0003
0.2093 0.4594 0.2322 0.0756 0.0104 0.0088 0.0042 0.0001
0.1044 0.1902 0.4084 0.2385 0.0342 0.0153 0.0048 0.0042
0.0642 0.0831 0.2016 0.4576 0.1314 0.0380 0.0241 0.0000
0.0313 0.0202 0.0784 0.2947 0.4285 0.0882 0.0408 0.0179
0.0246 0.0005 0.0898 0.1084 0.2462 0.3216 0.1862 0.0227
0.0108 0.0248 0.0432 0.0373 0.1163 0.2858 0.3923 0.0895





0.6936 0.2078 0.0546 0.0330 0.0031 0.0018 0.0061 0.0000
0.1972 0.5587 0.2001 0.0341 0.0077 0.0006 0.0000 0.0016
0.0620 0.1796 0.5233 0.2018 0.0154 0.0110 0.0069 0.0000
0.0214 0.0413 0.2024 0.5411 0.1526 0.0281 0.0116 0.0015
0.0272 0.0068 0.0348 0.3065 0.4581 0.1182 0.0484 0.0000
0.0163 0.0309 0.0084 0.0907 0.2946 0.3798 0.1512 0.0281
0.0404 0.0000 0.0007 0.0621 0.0830 0.2624 0.4869 0.0645





0.7111 0.2340 0.0352 0.0110 0.0070 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000
0.1847 0.5571 0.2078 0.0261 0.0142 0.0052 0.0020 0.0029
0.0579 0.1520 0.5429 0.1996 0.0339 0.0117 0.0020 0.0000
0.0214 0.0430 0.1833 0.5587 0.1576 0.0311 0.0027 0.0022
0.0191 0.0145 0.0217 0.3155 0.4644 0.1055 0.0593 0.0000
0.0416 0.0089 0.0512 0.1385 0.1427 0.3653 0.2094 0.0424
0.0247 0.0086 0.0354 0.0493 0.0777 0.2486 0.4942 0.0615





0.7000 0.2164 0.0514 0.0121 0.0110 0.0015 0.0076 0.0000
0.2215 0.5452 0.2117 0.0189 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0439 0.1743 0.5353 0.2043 0.0197 0.0123 0.0102 0.0000
0.0170 0.0525 0.1651 0.6075 0.1220 0.0190 0.0169 0.0000
0.0276 0.0085 0.0352 0.2608 0.4774 0.1690 0.0215 0.0000
0.0002 0.0127 0.0429 0.0898 0.2605 0.3345 0.2444 0.0150
0.0189 0.0210 0.0409 0.0213 0.2008 0.2026 0.4079 0.0866
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0127 0.1701 0.2386 0.5786
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
where Γi(j, k) = π(ei+1 = eki+1|ei = e
j
i ). For Run 6 (the 1/2 wage shock case), the transition matrixes
are modified to Γ1/2,i = (Γi + I8)/2, where I8 is the 8× 8 identity matrix.
The survival rates, calculated from the period life table in Social Security Administration (2001),




2.1. The Discretization of the State Space
The algorithm to solve the model for a steady-state equilibrium and an equilibrium transition path
is similar to that in Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) but is extended significantly to include Social
Security. The state of a household is s = (i, e, a, b) ∈ I × E × A × B, where I = {20, ..., 109},
E = [emin, emax], A = [amin, amax], and B = [bmin, bmax]. To compute an equilibrium, the state space
of a household is discretized as ŝ ∈ I×Ê×Â×B̂,where Êi = {e1i , e2i , ..., eNei }, Â = {a1, a2, ..., aNa},
and B̂ = {b1, b2, ..., bNb}. For all these discrete points, the model computes the optimal decision




∂bv(̂s,St;Ψt), and the values v(̂s,St;Ψt), given the expected factor prices and
policy variables.32
To find the optimal end-of-period wealth, the model uses the Euler equation and bilinear inter-
polation (with respect to a and b) of marginal values at the beginning of the next period.33 In a
heterogeneous-agent economy, Ne, Na, and Nb are 8, 50, and 8, respectively. In a representative-
agent economy, the numbers of grid points are 1, 71, and 6, respectively.34
2.2. A Steady-State Equilibrium
The algorithm to compute a steady-state equilibrium is as follows. LetΨ denote the time-invariant
government policy ruleΨ = (WLS,WG, CG, τ I(.), τP (.), trSS (̂s), trLS (̂s)).
1. Set the initial values of factor prices (r0, w0), accidental bequests q0, the policy variables (W 0LS ,
C0G), lump-sum redistribution tr0LS (̂s), and the parameters (ϕ0I , ϕ0P , ϕ0SS) of policy functions
(τ I(.), τP (.), trSS(.)) if these are determined endogenously.35
2. Given Ω0 = (r0, w0, q0,W 0LS , C0G, ϕ0I , ϕ0P , ϕ0SS), find the decision rule of a household d(̂s;
Ψ,Ω0) for all ŝ ∈ I × Ê × Â× B̂.36
(a) For age i = 109, find the decision rule d(̂s[i=109];Ψ,Ω0). Since the survival rate φ109 = 0,
the end-of-period wealth a0(̂s[i=109]; .) = 0 for all ŝ[i=109]. Compute consumption and
working hours (c(̂s[i=109]; .), h(̂s[i=109]; .)) and, then, marginal values ∂∂av(̂s[i=109];Ψ,Ω
0)
and values v(̂s[i=109];Ψ,Ω0) for all ŝ[i=109].37
32Because the marginal value with respect to historical earnings, ∂ v(̂s,St;Ψt), is difficult to obtain analytically, it is
approximated by (v(., bj+1,St;Ψt)− v(., bj ,St;Ψt))/(bj+1 − bj) where j = 1, 2, ...,Nb.
33The marginal values with respect to wealth, ∂∂av(̂s,St;Ψt), are used in the Euler equation to obtain optimal savings, the
marginal values with respect to historical earnings, ∂
∂b
v(̂s,St;Ψt), are used in the marginal rate of substitution condition of
consumption for leisure to obtain optimal working hours, and the values, v(̂s,St;Ψt), are used to calculate welfare changes
measured by compensating and equivalent variations in wealth.
34The grid points on A and B are not equally spaced. In a heterogeneous-agent economy, Â ranges from -$266,200 to
$14,817,600 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) and B̂ ranges from $10,000 to $80,400. In a representative-agent economy,
Â and B̂ range from -$333,000 to $2,626,900 and from $16,900 to $57,500, respectively.
35If we find the capital-labor ratio, both r and w are calculated from the given production function and depreciation rate.
In this paper, the endogenous policy variables are CG and ϕSS in baseline economies, and ϕI , ϕP , trLS (̂s), and WLS in
policy experiments.
36In the steady-state economy, the decision rule of a household d(̂s;Ψ,Ω0) is not a function of the aggregate state of
economy Ŝ = (x(̂s),WLS ,WG). The measure of household x(̂s) is determined uniquely by the steady-state condition, and
the government’s wealth WG is determined by the policy rule Ψ.
37The marginal value with respect to historical earnings, ∂
∂b
v(̂s;Ψ,Ω0), is zero when i > 60 in this paper.
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(b) For age i = 108, ..., 20, find the decision ruled(̂s[i];Ψ,Ω0), marginal values ∂∂av(̂s[i];Ψ,Ω
0),




i. Set the initial guess of a00(̂s[i]; .).
ii. Given a00(̂s[i]; .), compute (c(̂s[i]; .), h(̂s[i]; .)), using ∂∂bv(̂s[i+1];Ψ,Ω
0). Plug these
into the Euler equation with ∂∂av(̂s[i+1];Ψ,Ω
0).
iii. If the Euler error is sufficiently small, then stop. Otherwise, update a00(̂s[i]; .) and
return to Step ii.
3. Find the steady-state measure of households x(̂s[i];Ω0) using the decision rule obtained in Step
2. This computation is done forward from age 20 to age 109. Repeat this step to iterate q for q1.
4. Compute new factor prices (r1, w1), accidental bequests q1, the policy variables (W 1LS ,









5. Compare Ω1 = (r1, w1, q1,W 1LS , C1G, τ1C , ϕ1I , ϕ1SS) with Ω0. If the difference is sufficiently
small, then stop. Otherwise, updateΩ0 and return to Step 2.
2.3. An Equilibrium Transition Path
Assume that the economy is in the initial steady state in period 0, and that the new policy schedule Ψ1,
which was not expected in period 0, is announced at the beginning of period 1, whereΨ1 = {WLS,t+1,
WG,t+1, CG,t, τ I,t(.), τP,t(.), trSS,t(̂s), trLS,t(̂s)}∞t=1. Let Ŝ1 = (x1(̂s),WLS,1,WG,1) be the state
of the economy at the beginning of period 1. The state of the economy Ŝ1 is usually equal to that of
the initial steady state. The algorithm to compute a transition path to a new steady-state equilibrium
(thereafter, final steady-state equilibrium) is as follows.
1. Choose a sufficiently large number, T , such that the economy is said to reach the new steady
state within T periods. Set the initial guess, Ω01 = {r0s , w0s , q0s ,W 0LS,s, C0G,s, ϕ0I,s, ϕ0P,s}Ts=1,
on factor prices, accidental bequests, and the policy variables. Because there are no aggregate
productivity shocks in this model, a time seriesΩt = {r0s , w0s , q0s , W 0LS,s, C0G,t, ϕ0I,s, ϕ0P,s}Ts=t is
deterministic, and each household perfectly foreseesΩt based on the information Ŝt in an equi-
librium. Since Ŝt is in a household decision rule only to make the household expectΩt rationally,
in the computation, we can avoid the “curse of dimensionality” by replacing d(̂s, Ŝt;Ψt) with
d(̂s;Ψt,Ωt).
2. Given WLS,T , find the final steady-state decision rule d(̂s; ΨT , Ω0T ), marginal values,
∂
∂av(̂s;
ΨT , Ω0T ), and values v(̂s; ΨT , Ω0T ) for all ŝ ∈ I × Ê × Â × B̂. (See the algorithm for a
steady-state equilibrium.)
3. For period t = T −1, T −2, ..., 1, based on the guess,Ω0t , find backward the decision rule d(̂s[i];
Ψt,Ω0t ), marginal values ∂∂av(̂s[i];Ψt,Ω
0
t ), and values v(̂s[i];Ψt,Ω0t ) for all ŝ ∈ I×Ê×Â×B̂,
using the next period marginal values ∂∂av(̂s[i+1];Ψt+1,Ω
0
t+1) and values v(̂s[i+1];Ψt+1,Ω0t+1)
recursively.
4. For period t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1, compute forward (r0t , w0t , q0t ,W 0LS,t, C0G,t, ϕ0I,t, ϕ0P,t) and the
measure of households xt+1(̂s), using the decision rule d(̂s;Ψt,Ω0t ) obtained in Step 3 and
using the state of economy Ŝt = (xt(̂s),WLS,t,WG,t) recursively.
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5. Compare Ω1t with Ω0t . If the difference is sufficiently small, then stop. Otherwise, update Ω0t
and return to Step 2.
2.4. The Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority
When the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA) is assumed, the following computation is
added to the iteration process.
1. For period t = T, T−1, ..., 2, compute the lump-sum transfers to newborn households trCV (̂s[i=20];
Ψt,Ω0t ) to make those households as well off as under the pre-reform economy.
(a) Set the initial value of lump-sum transfers trCV (̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ) to newborn households.
(b) Given trCV (̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ), find the decision rule of newborn households d(̂s[i=20]; Ψt,
Ω0t ) and values v(̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ).
(c) Find the compensating variation in wealth ∆trCV (̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ) to make those house-
holds indifferent from the baseline economy. (The initial wealth of newborn households
is assumed to be zero since they do not receive any bequests.) If the absolute value
of ∆trCV (̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ) is sufficiently small, then go to Step (d). Otherwise, update
trCV (̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω
0
t ) by adding∆trCV (̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ) and return to Step (b).
(d) Set the lump-sum transfers trLS,t(̂s[i=20]) = trCV (̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ) + ∆tr where an ad-
ditional lump-sum transfer ∆tr is precalculated, and find the decision rule of newborn
households d(̂s[i=20];Ψt,Ω0t ).
2. For period t = 1, compute the lump-sum transfers to all current households trCV (̂s;Ψt, Ω0t ) to
make those households as much better off as the pre-reform economy. The procedure is similar
to Step 1. Set the lump-sum transfers trLS,1(̂s) = trCV (̂s;Ψt,Ω0t ).
3. Compute an additional lump-sum transfer ∆tr to newborn households so that the net present
value of all transfers becomes zero. Compute the LSRA wealth, {W 1LS,t}Tt=1, which will be used
to calculate national wealth. Recompute∆tr and {W 1LS,t}Tt=1 using new interest rates {rt}Tt=1.
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PARAMETERS INDEPENDENT OF MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 2.0
Capital share of output θ 0.30
Depreciation rate of capital stock δ 0.047
Long-term real growth rate μ 0.018
Population growth rate ν 0.010
Probability of receiving bequests η 0.0161
Total factor productivitya A 0.949
a. Total factor productivity is chosen so that w equals 1.0.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS THAT VARY BY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Heterogeneous-agent economy
Representative- with wage shocks
agent model Without With Less Smaller
without wage annuity annuity redist- transitory
shocks market market ribution shocks
(Run 1) (Runs 2, 3) (Run 4) (Run 5) (Run 6)
Time preferencea β 1.008 0.986 0.993 0.986 0.988
Consumption shareb α 0.455 0.504 0.494 0.500 0.489
Income tax adjustmentc ϕI 1.000 0.817 0.823 0.818 0.844
OASDI benefit adjustmentd ϕSS 1.315 1.463 1.459 1.695 1.468
a. The capital-GDP ratio is targeted to be 2.74 (r = 6.25 percent) without annuity markets.
b. The average annual working hours are 3,576 per married couple when hmax = 8,760.
c. In a heterogeneous-agent economy, the ratio of income tax revenue to GDP is 0.123.
d. OASDI benefits are pay-as-you-go.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF PEOPLE UNDER AGE 18 LIVING IN A MARRIED HOUSEHOLD
Age cohorts Number of children Age cohorts Number of children
20-24 0.824 50-54 0.576
25-29 0.957 55-59 0.196
30-34 1.512 60-64 0.109
35-39 1.759 65-69 0.084
40-44 1.700 70-74 0.025
45-49 1.152 75-79 0.028
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2003 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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TABLE IV
WORKING ABILITIES OF A HOUSEHOLD (IN U.S. DOLLARS PER HOUR)
Percentile Age cohorts
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
e1 0-20th 6.59 6.79 7.23 7.58 6.63 7.06
e2 20-40th 9.13 11.90 12.99 14.13 13.65 14.01
e3 40-60th 11.13 15.15 17.63 19.43 18.76 19.84
e4 60-80th 13.89 18.79 23.72 25.98 26.56 26.51
e5 80-90th 17.89 23.07 31.94 36.66 37.30 34.38
e6 90-95th 22.17 28.75 44.87 50.36 51.30 43.69
e7 95-99th 28.92 37.02 70.45 90.33 74.86 76.14
e8 99-100th 50.99 68.56 111.40 180.53 211.09 239.59
Percentile Age cohorts
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79
e1 0-20th 6.45 2.76 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
e2 20-40th 14.02 11.90 4.54 0.01 0.00 0.00
e3 40-60th 20.46 17.75 12.55 3.56 0.00 0.00
e4 60-80th 27.89 25.24 20.40 12.35 1.64 0.35
e5 80-90th 37.71 32.90 32.30 22.41 7.45 10.15
e6 90-95th 47.60 43.79 42.47 34.78 12.52 20.57
e7 95-99th 81.61 68.69 57.48 47.01 19.22 36.73
e8 99-100th 247.47 443.14 89.02 101.28 100.08 51.30
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2003 PSID.
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TABLE V
MARGINAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES IN 2001 (MARRIED HOUSEHOLD, FILED JOINTLY)
Taxable income Marginal income tax rate (%)
$0 – $45,200 15.0 × ϕI
$45,200 – $109,250 28.0 × ϕI
$109,250 – $166,500 31.0 × ϕI
$166,500 – $297,350 36.0 × ϕI
$297,350 – 39.6 × ϕI
TABLE VI
MARGINAL PAYROLL TAX RATES IN 2001
Taxable labor Marginal tax rate (%)
income per worker OASDI HI
$0 – $80,400 12.4 × ϕP 2.9
$80,400 – 0.0 × ϕP 2.9
Note: The payroll tax adjustment factor ϕP equals 1.0 in the baseline economy.
TABLE VII
OASDI REPLACEMENT RATES IN 2001
AIME (b/12) Marginal replacement rate (%)
$0 – $561 90.0 × ϕSS
$561 – $3,381 32.0 × ϕSS
$3,381 – 15.0 × ϕSS




PERCENT CHANGE IN SELECTED MACRO VARIABLES RELATIVE TO BASELINE
GNP National Labor Interest Wage Income Payroll
Run # Year t wealth supply rate rate tax tax
rateb rate
1 1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Representative 10 1.0 2.4 0.4 -2.4 0.6 -2.7 -4.8
agent without 20 3.5 6.4 2.3 -4.7 1.2 -9.3 -16.4
wage shocksa 40 8.9 16.6 5.8 -11.5 2.9 -20.7 -42.5
Long run 12.3 26.7 6.7 -19.8 5.3 -25.5 -51.9
2 1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.1
Heterogenous 10 0.8 1.7 0.5 -1.5 0.4 -1.5 -4.3
agents with 20 2.1 4.2 1.3 -3.5 0.9 -3.8 -14.9
wage shocksa 40 5.6 11.8 3.0 -9.8 2.5 -8.9 -40.9
Long run 7.7 18.8 3.3 -16.4 4.3 -11.2 -52.1
a. Closed economy, no private annuity markets, and LSRA is off.
b. The proportional change in marginal tax rates across all households.
TABLE IX
CHANGE IN WELFARE PER HOUSEHOLD (1,000 DOLLARS IN 2001)
Age in Without LSRAa With LSRAb
Run # year 1 select productivities for all
e1 e3 e5 e8 productivities
1 79 - -0.6 - - 0.0
Representative 60 - -30.4 - - 0.0
agent without 40 - -78.3 - - 0.0
wage shocks 20 - -41.7 - - 0.0
0 - 18.5 - - 30.1
-20 - 57.2 - - 30.1
-∞ - 66.1 - - 30.1
2 79 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.0
Heterogenous 60 -22.1 -29.8 -37.8 -56.8 0.0
agents with 40 -32.9 -51.9 -82.4 -134.1 0.0
wage shocks 20 -9.8 -12.8 -17.5 -30.0 0.0
0 31.5 32.5 32.2 22.3 -8.1
-20 62.8 67.8 72.3 67.0 -8.1
-∞ 72.6 79.1 84.8 81.3 -8.1




ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE HETEROGENOUS AGENT ECONOMY WITH WAGE SHOCKS
PERCENT CHANGE IN SELECTED MACRO VARIABLES RELATIVE TO BASELINE
GNP National Labor Interest Wage Income Payroll
Run # Year t wealth supply rate rate tax tax
rateb rate
3 1 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.3
Small open 10 1.4 3.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -4.2
economya 20 3.2 8.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 -4.2 -14.2
40 7.6 20.6 2.0 0.0 0.0 -8.9 -39.5
Long run 11.3 35.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 -10.8 -50.8
4 1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.2
Perfect annuity 10 0.6 1.3 0.3 -1.3 0.2 -1.1 -4.1
marketsa 20 1.7 3.4 0.9 -3.0 0.7 -3.0 -14.6
40 4.5 9.3 2.6 -7.6 1.9 -7.6 -40.6
Long run 6.3 14.5 2.9 -12.6 3.3 -9.9 -51.9
5 1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2
Less 10 0.8 1.7 0.4 -1.6 0.4 -1.4 -4.1
initial 20 2.0 4.1 1.1 -3.6 0.9 -3.5 -14.7
redistributiona 40 5.3 11.6 2.8 -9.8 2.5 -8.5 -40.6
Long run 7.4 18.4 3.0 -16.2 4.3 -10.8 -51.4
6 1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 0.0
1
2 transitory 10 1.0 2.0 0.6 -1.6 0.4 -1.9 -4.5
shocksa 20 2.5 4.9 1.5 -4.0 1.0 -4.5 -15.2
40 6.3 13.2 3.5 -10.7 2.7 -10.1 -41.2
Long run 8.7 20.9 3.9 -17.7 4.7 -12.8 -52.3
a. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2, i.e., the changes are not cumulative.
b. The proportional change in marginal tax rates across all households.
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TABLE XI
CHANGE IN WELFARE PER HOUSEHOLD (1,000 DOLLARS IN 2001)
Age in Without LSRAa With LSRAb
Run # year 1 select productivities for all
e1 e3 e5 e8 productivities
3 79 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Small open 60 -20.3 -26.7 -31.1 -23.4 0.0
economyc 40 -29.0 -45.6 -67.6 -72.9 0.0
20 -7.1 -9.0 -11.7 -16.7 0.0
0 27.1 29.5 33.0 38.3 -10.1
-20 52.3 59.2 68.4 84.4 -10.1
-∞ 60.3 68.5 79.9 99.5 -10.1
4 79 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 0.0
Perfect annuity 60 -18.6 -23.6 -28.6 -42.9 0.0
marketsc 40 -31.2 -47.5 -68.8 -99.7 0.0
20 -12.1 -15.3 -20.1 -31.0 0.0
0 22.3 21.9 20.0 9.4 -10.9
-20 47.3 49.9 51.5 43.9 -10.9
-∞ 53.9 57.2 59.8 54.0 -10.9
5 79 -0.25 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 0.0
Less 60 -22.4 -30.1 -38.9 -60.7 0.0
initial 40 -32.6 -52.3 -84.2 -137.8 0.0
redistributionc 20 -10.1 -13.1 -17.9 -30.5 0.0
0 31.1 32.0 31.5 21.5 -9.4
-20 61.9 66.8 71.0 65.6 -9.4
-∞ 70.9 77.2 82.6 78.9 -9.4
6 79 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.9 0.0
1
2 transitory 60 -19.3 -29.7 -39.3 -68.1 0.0
shocksc 40 -29.8 -56.2 -92.7 -161.8 0.0
20 -11.7 -17.5 -25.8 -45.8 0.0
0 27.0 27.2 25.4 8.1 -14.0
-20 56.1 62.2 66.8 57.0 -14.0
-∞ 65.2 73.2 79.6 72.7 -14.0
a. Standard equivalent variations measures.
b. Value of∆tr.
c. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2, i.e., the changes are not cumulative.
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TABLE XII
ALTERNATIVE EXPERIMENTS IN THE HETEROGENOUS AGENT ECONOMY WITH WAGE SHOCKS
PERCENT CHANGE IN SELECTED MACRO VARIABLES RELATIVE TO BASELINE
GNP National Labor Interest Wage Income Payroll
Run # Year t wealth supply rate rate tax tax
rateb rate
7 1 -1.3 0.0 -1.9 -2.3 0.6 5.9 2.0
Contribution 10 -1.0 -0.5 -1.2 -0.8 0.2 4.9 -2.3
matching 20 0.1 1.2 -0.3 -1.8 0.5 2.6 -13.3
starting at 10%a 40 3.6 8.2 1.7 -7.5 1.9 -3.3 -40.3
Long run 5.9 15.3 2.0 -14.4 3.7 -6.1 -51.8
8 1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3
More progressive 10 0.4 1.2 0.1 -1.4 0.3 -0.7 -2.8
S.S. bend points 20 1.3 3.1 0.6 -2.9 0.7 -2.4 -11.2
120 / 33 / 7.5%a 40 4.2 9.1 2.2 -7.9 2.0 -6.9 -34.3
Long run 6.2 15.3 2.5 -13.8 3.6 -9.3 -45.6
9 1 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.5 0.6
More progressive 10 0.0 0.6 -0.3 -1.1 0.3 0.1 -1.4
S.S. bend points 20 0.6 2.1 0.0 -2.5 0.6 -1.1 -7.5
150 / 34 / 0%a 40 3.0 6.8 1.4 -6.2 1.6 -5.0 -27.6
Long run 4.8 12.1 1.8 -11.4 2.9 -7.3 -38.7
10 1 0.7 0.0 0.9 1.2 -0.3 -4.4 -50.0
More progressive 10 1.3 2.6 0.7 -2.2 0.5 -4.8 -50.0
S.S. bend points 20 2.1 4.9 0.9 -4.7 1.2 -5.6 -50.0
150 / 34 / 0% 40 4.0 9.6 1.8 -8.9 2.2 -7.5 -50.0
and consumption Long run 5.1 12.9 1.9 -12.1 3.1 -8.3 -50.0
tax financinga
a. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2, i.e., the changes are not cumulative.
b. The proportional change in marginal tax rates across all households.
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TABLE XIII
CHANGE IN WELFARE PER HOUSEHOLD (1,000 DOLLARS IN 2001)
Age in Without LSRAa With LSRAb
Run # year 1 select productivities for all
e1 e3 e5 e8 productivities
7 79 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.6 0.0
Contribution 60 -22.7 -29.3 -43.4 -103.4 0.0
matching 40 -29.3 -55.5 -94.3 -179.1 0.0
starting at 10%c 20 -5.4 -10.0 -19.4 -38.2 0.0
0 34.3 33.5 28.4 12.6 -13.2
-20 65.9 69.3 69.1 58.8 -13.2
-∞ 76.0 80.5 81.7 73.5 -13.2
8 79 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 0.0
More progressive 60 -16.9 -22.5 -30.3 -51.6 0.0
S.S. bend points 40 -24.9 -41.7 -70.2 -115.5 0.0
120 / 33 / 7.5%c 20 -9.2 -11.9 -16.2 -27.0 0.0
0 25.9 26.3 25.5 16.7 -7.1
-20 54.1 58.4 62.0 57.5 -7.1
-∞ 63.3 68.7 73.8 71.3 -7.1
9 79 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.9 0.0
More progressive 60 -11.7 -15.3 -22.9 -46.4 0.0
S.S. bend points 40 -18.2 -31.9 -58.2 -97.7 0.0
150 / 34 / 0%c 20 -8.9 -11.5 -15.4 -24.7 0.0
0 18.2 17.9 17.0 10.0 -6.7
-20 45.2 48.7 51.5 47.3 -6.7
-∞ 53.7 58.2 62.3 60.5 -6.7
10 79 -9.7 -10.4 -12.9 -22.3 0.0
More progressive 60 -25.9 -34.5 -51.3 -186.0 0.0
S.S. bend points 40 -16.3 -28.9 -63.3 -188.3 0.0
150 / 34 / 0% 20 4.2 2.5 0.6 -8.8 0.0
and consumption 0 29.3 31.1 32.4 25.3 2.8
tax financingc -20 50.1 54.5 58.4 54.6 2.8
-∞ 56.7 61.7 66.2 63.7 2.8
a. Standard equivalent variations measures.
b. Value of∆tr.
c. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2, i.e., the changes are not cumulative.
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